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Nominal stock price anchors: A global phenomenon?
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a b s t r a c t
Weld et al. (2009) find that the average nominal U.S. stock price has been approximately
$25 since the Great Depression. They report that this “nominal price fixation is primarily a
U.S. or North American phenomenon.” Using a larger data set from 38 countries, we show
that this nominal price fixation is a global phenomenon. We exploit the introduction of the
euro in 1999 to show that stock splits maintain these nominal stock price anchors.
Generally, firms in countries with larger drops in nominal prices had fewer stock splits
after stock prices were displayed in euros.
Anchoring is a cognitive bias that describes the common human tendency to rely excessively on the first piece of infor-
mation offered (the “anchor”) when making decisions. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe an experiment in which a
group of students, given five seconds to evaluate the product of eight numbers, estimated that 1X2X3X4X5X6X7X8 was 512
but 8X7X6X5X4X3X2X1 was 2250. The first digit, the anchor, mattered.1
Anchors also matter in finance. In an intriguing paper, Weld et al. (2009) find that the average nominal price for a share of
stock on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) has been approximately $25 since
the Great Depression. The price has not even kept pace with the rate of inflation. However, they find that 16 other countries
did not share this peculiar trait. Hence, they conclude that the nominal price fixation is primarily a U.S. or North American
phenomenon.
The goal of this paper is to revisit their last conclusion. Because anchoring is such a common human trait, we are skeptical
that the United States is the only country whose stock markets exhibit this phenomenon. To find out whether the nominal
price fixation is indeed a U.S. phenomenon, we extend the analysis by Weld et al. (2009) to international markets using a
larger data set. We collect the nominal stock prices of firms, in both the local currency and the U.S. dollar, at the end of June in
each year for 38 countries from 1981 to 2010.
Five interesting, sometimes, surprising facts stand out in this panel. The first four are suggestive and the fifth is our main
formal test. First, whenwe compute themean or median level of stock prices in a country over the sample period, we observe
a large variation between countries. The mean (median) of the nominal price level in Switzerland, for example, is $925
($348.9), whereas that of Hong Kong is only $0.6 ($0.1). The U.S. mean (median) share price is $51.3 ($21.9).2 It is clear that a
global anchor does not exist.
Second, surprisingly, the median nominal stock price of all surviving firms in our sample remains remarkably flat and
stable throughout the sample period, suggesting that nominal share prices are held roughly constant, although these firms
generate positive returns on average. In fact, the median level of nominal stock prices in 2010 is remarkably similar to the
median level of nominal stock prices 29 years earlier.
Third, a firm's nominal stock price has a tendency to revert to the stock price level that it had when it first entered the
panel. Whenwe partition our sample firms into tercile groups by their nominal stock price levels every year and keep track of
the tercile group membership, we find that a majority of firms in almost all countries remains in their initial tercile group
most of the time.
Fourth,Weld et al. (2009) show that the correlation between average nominal stock prices and the primary stock exchange
index in their sample of 16 countries is the lowest and the next-to-lowest for the New York Stock Exchange and the Toronto
Stock Exchange, respectively. They argue that the low correlations in the U.S. and Canada are suggestive of the fact that
nominal price fixation is primarily a North American phenomenon. Our results for 38 countries show that most of them had
lower correlations than the U.S. or Canada.
Fifth, and finally, we show that nominal stock prices tend to revert to their country-specific anchors due to corporate
actions, such as stock splits and reverse stock splits. This is our main test. This test exploits the introduction of the euro in
January 1, 1999. Nominal stock prices in nine European Union members in our sample were converted to the euro using the
fixed exchange rate set for each country on December 31, 1998. There was a large variation in conversion rates. For instance,
the conversion rate for the Italian lira was 1936.27 lira per euro, whereas the conversion rate for the German deutsche mark
was 1.95583. Given these conversion rates, after the euro was introduced, countries like Italy had larger drops in nominal
prices than countries like Germany. This implies that if stock splits (reverse stock splits) are used by corporations to decrease
(increase) their nominal prices towards an anchorda hypothesis that was first introduced by Dyl and Elliott (2006)dItalian
firms should split a lot less than German firms (or perhaps even engage in more reverse-splits) after the introduction of the
euro. We test this prediction and find consistent evidence.
We use the proportion of firms with stock splits and the proportion of firms with reverse stock splits around the intro-
duction of the euro. We do not see a statistically significant change in the number of German firms doing stock splits after the
introduction of the euro. In contrast, we see the number of Italian firms doing stock splits decreasing after the introduction of
the euro. The statistical significance is strong. More generally, for the 9 euro countries that we have data on, if the conversion
rate was x local currency to 1 euro, the higher the x, whichmeans the higher the drop in nominal prices, the larger is the drop
in stock splits. Reverse stock splits are rare occurrences. However, even here, we see an increase in the number of Italian firms
doing reverse stock splits after the introduction of the euro. The change in reverse stock splits for the other countries are
insignificant. This test gives us formal confirmatory evidence that firms indeed like to have fixed nominal anchors.
Our findings have links, directly and indirectly, with many studies. The direct link is with Weld et al. (2009), who find that
firms proactively use corporate actions like stock splits to keep their prices within a narrow trading range. Why? They
conclude that it must be norms and traditions. In our paper, we show that this phenomenon is global, and we therefore
conclude that norms and traditions exist in all countries, not just in the U.S. Our paper also has a direct link to Dyl and Elliott
(2006), who find that firms tailor their share prices around a specific range to reflect the desires of owners for an “anchor.”
George and Hwang (2004) observe that investors use the 52-week high as an “anchor” against which they value stocks. Baker
et al. (2012) show that the 52-week high price is a reference point for valuing corporations in mergers and acquisitions.
Incidentally, anchoring exists not just in financial markets but also in many other markets.3 That leads to our last question.
Why do firms use anchors? The anchoring literature in finance suggests that firms are catering to their investors because their
investors use anchors. So our paper has important ramifications for the catering hypothesis (Baker et al., 2009) literature, as
well as the investor recognition literature (Merton, 1987). A definite exploration of the question of why firms use anchors,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
2 The mean nominal price of $51.3 for U.S. stocks in our sample differs from the mean price of $25 in Weld et al. (2009) for many reasons. Our sample
covers only the stocks on NYSE from 1981 to 2010, whereas their sample covers all NYSE and AMEX stocks from 1933 to 2007. A more important difference
is that they exclude Berkshire Hathaway from the sample, whereas we include it. The mean price drops to $26.2 without Berkshire Hathaway in our sample.
3 Flood and Mussa (1994) discuss how important inflation anchors are in generating price stability in monetary policy. Exchange rates serve as anchors
(Edwards, 1992). Precedents in legal theory are nothing but anchors (e.g., Diamond et al., 2011). In labor economics, the concept of career anchors, first
explored by Schein and Maanen (1990), is becoming a fruitful field of study. In marketing, it has been determined that the purchase decision and the sell
decision use different anchors (see, Simonson and Drolet, 2004). In real estate, prior price discounts serve as anchors in the housing choice decision (Arbel
et al., 2014).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we describe our data sources, sample construction, and summary
statistics. In Section 2, we analyze the trends in nominal stock prices. In Section 3, we examine how the introduction of the
euro exogenously affected nominal anchors and the consequent corporate actions undertaken to deal with this. We conclude
in Section 4.
1. Data
1.1. Nominal stock price
We start with the 49 countries analyzed in La Porta et al. (2006). We drop the following nine countries that have fewer
than 40 firms on average: Ecuador, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. We also
exclude Finland andMexico because they have less than 10 yearly observations of nominal stock prices prior to their currency
regime changes, on which we elaborate later. The remaining 38 countries have reasonably large stock markets. We collect
nominal stock prices of firms listed on each country's main organized exchange, in both the local currency and the U.S. dollar,
at the end of June in each year from 1981 to 2010.4 We define the main organized exchange in a country as the exchange that
holds the largest total stock market capitalization of the listed firms in that country. For example, the New York Stock Ex-
change and the London Stock Exchange, respectively, are the main exchanges in the U.S. and the U.K. The nominal stock price
data are obtained from Datastream. We require that our sample firms have at least 10 consecutive yearly observations of
nominal stock prices and market capitalizations. This restriction results in a sample of 21,285 firms from the 38 countries.
The first four columns of Table 1 show the list of countries in the sample, the sample period in each country, the number of
firms, and the name of the local currency. There is a large variation in the number of sample firms covered by Datastream
across countries ranging from a minimum of 44 firms in Brazil to a maximum of 2816 firms in the U.S. For most countries, the
sample period is 20e30 years. The last four columns of Table 1 present the mean and the median of the nominal stock prices
at the end of June in each year in the local currency and in the U.S. dollar for each country during the sample period.We notice
that the mean share price is much higher than the median share price in all countries. In quite a few cases, the mean price is
several times higher than the median price, suggesting positively skewed distributions in nominal stock prices. An extreme
case is Chile, where the mean price (3,813,682 pesos) is 13,620 times greater than the median price (280 pesos). We focus on
the median prices in the analyses that follow because of this positive skewness.
The main takeaway from Table 1 is the observation that there is a large variation in nominal prices between countries. The
mean (median) of the nominal price level in Switzerland, for example, is $925 ($348.9), whereas that of Hong Kong is only
$0.6 ($0.1). The U.S. mean (median) share price is $51.3 ($21.9). It is clear that a global anchor does not exist.
We note that some of our sample countries have experienced regime changes with respect to their local currencies. For
example, nine European countries in our sample adopted the euro in 1999.5 Turkey revalued its currency in 2005 as well. In
the Datastream database, the nominal stock prices in a country before a regime change are denoted in the new currency after
the regime change (i.e., the euro for all euro currency countries, and the new lira for Turkey). This implies that nominal stock
prices before the regime change are converted by Datastream to new nominal stock prices using the conversion rate on the
date of the regime change. For example, all local currency nominal prices in the euro area before January of 1999 were
converted to and presented in euros using the fixed exchange rate set for each country on December 31, 1998. Similarly, the
Turkish lira before January 1, 2005 was converted to and presented in the new currency using a fixed conversion rate set on
December 31, 2004.
If anchors exist in nominal stock prices, currency regime changes are likely to have disrupted the existing anchors. For this
reason, they offer us a natural experiment to observe what happens during the change. We exploit this insight in our main
analysis.
1.2. Other variables
We collect from Datastream the total return index of each stock that captures the actual growth in the value of a share held
over the previous year to the current year adjusted for all capital distributions, including cash dividends, stock splits, stock
dividends, etc.
To examine stock split and reverse stock split activities of firms from the nine countries that adopted the euro in 1999 (we
exclude Greece because it adopted the euro two years later), we obtain data from Capital IQ (CIQ) Key Development and
RavenPack databases. These databases provide summaries of material news and events that may affect the market value of
securities. We used two databases for cross-checking. The specific data we obtained were the dates of the stock split or the
reverse stock split, and the corresponding split ratios. The split ratio for each firm in each year is greater than 1 (less than 1)
{equal to 0} if the firm splits (reverse splits) {does not split}. We require that the firms be present during the eight-year period
from 1998 to 2005. The sample selection results in 1225 euro firms, with France representing themost firms (416) followed by
Germany (314) and Italy (111).
4 Some countries have more than one exchange with different listing rules. We focus on the main exchange so as to obtain one exchange per country.
5 The number of euro countries in our sample becomes ten as Greece adopted the euro on January 1, 2001.
2. Trends in nominal stock prices
2.1. Time series trends of nominal stock prices
In this subsection, we investigate the time series trends of nominal stock prices. To obtain an overall picture of the trend in
nominal stock prices, we examine the median nominal stock prices of the firms in our sample during the 1981e2010 period.
To eliminate the potential effect of the entry and exit of firms on the nominal stock price trend, and the potential effect of mid-
period anchor changes [stocks from euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain) and Turkey], we include only the 1657 firms that did not have mid-period anchor changes and had
existed for the entire sample period. To compare the averages of nominal prices that are in different local currencies, we
“normalize” all local currencies by converting them to U.S. dollars at the exchange rate on June 30, 2000.
Fig. 1 shows the time series trends of various prices. Panel A depicts the trends of the median nominal stock prices and the
median total return stock prices of the sample firms. The median nominal stock price in year t is the median of the
“normalized” nominal stock prices of the sample firms in year t. The median total return stock price is the median of the
adjusted “normalized” stock prices, where the adjusted stock price reflects the actual total return (growth in the value of a
share held over the sample period assuming dividends are reinvested). We also present trends in the equal- and value-
weighted total “normalized” index returns constructed from the total returns of the 1657 firms. Both of these indices are
scaled to be one U.S. dollar as of 1981.
Table 1
Mean and median of nominal stock prices per country. This table shows the mean and median of nominal stock prices in local currency at the end of June
in each year from 1981 to 2010 per country. It also shows the mean and median of nominal stock prices in U.S. dollars at the end of June in each year from
1981 to 2010 per country. To be included in the sample, firms are required to have at least 10 consecutive yearly observations.
Country Period No. of firms Local currency U.S. dollars
Name Mean Median Mean Median
Argentina 94e10 80 Argentine peso 4.6 2.0 2.4 1.0
Australia 81e10 1154 Australian dollar 2.2 0.4 1.6 0.3
Austria 86e10 114 Euroa 143.7 47.5 164.5 55.1
Belgium 81e10 206 Euroa 249.5 72.6 287.1 79.3
Brazil 94e10 44 Real 90.3 25.0 55.8 13.5
Canada 81e10 1351 Canadian dollar 9.3 3.1 7.3 2.4
Chile 90e10 208 Chilean peso 3,813,682 280.0 7748.5 0.6
Colombia 95e10 51 Colombian peso 5436.4 1500.0 2.8 0.8
Denmark 87e10 224 Danish krone 1609.8 335.0 248.9 51.2
Egypt 97e10 95 Egyptian pound 58.3 24.4 12.6 5.0
France 81e10 966 Euroa 109.5 40.9 125.9 45.5
Germany 81e10 846 Euroa 134.9 36.5 152.3 41.4
Greece 88e10 279 Euroa 8.5 4.0 11.0 4.8
Hong Kong 81e10 736 Hong Kong dollar 4.4 1.0 0.6 0.1
India 90e10 1524 Indian rupee 51.0 9.2 1.4 0.2
Indonesia 91e10 264 Rupiah 2849.2 850.4 0.7 0.1
Ireland 86e10 71 Euroa 4.3 2.0 5.1 2.3
Israel 86e10 559 New shekel 128.7 6.9 43.1 1.9
Italy 81e10 312 Euroa 6.7 3.1 8.4 3.9
Japan 81e10 2343 Yen 10,720.2 706.0 93.1 5.8
Malaysia 86e10 721 Ringgit 3.4 1.9 1.2 0.5
Netherlands 81e10 233 Euroa 118.6 24.7 127.3 27.2
New Zealand 99e10 66 New Zealand dollar 2.3 1.4 1.4 0.8
Norway 81e10 180 Norwegian krone 166.1 88.5 24.0 12.7
Pakistan 93e10 301 Pakistani rupee 63.6 18.0 1.2 0.3
Peru 92e10 126 Nuevo sol 149.6 1.6 48.3 0.6
Philippines 90e10 209 Philippine peso 41.5 1.8 1.2 0.0
Portugal 88e10 116 Euroa 10.2 6.5 12.4 7.9
Singapore 83e10 369 Singapore dollar 2.3 0.9 1.4 0.5
South Africa 81e10 463 Rand 22.6 5.0 5.4 1.0
South Korea 85e10 785 Won 21,307 12,450 22.8 13.7
Spain 87e10 170 Euroa 23.9 13.5 30.2 16.2
Sweden 82e10 325 Krona 98.6 63.0 13.4 8.2
Switzerland 81e10 298 Swiss franc 1397.9 510.0 925.0 348.9
Thailand 89e10 385 Baht 76.6 22.7 2.7 0.6
Turkey 92e10 272 Turkish lirab 16.1 4.2 123.0 5.2
United Kingdom 81e10 2023 British pound 3.3 1.2 5.4 2.0
United States 81e10 2816 US dollar 51.3 21.9 51.3 21.9
Total 81 ~ 10 21,285 135.9 4.0
a Local currencies before January 1999 (2001) were converted to the euro using fixed exchange rates set on December 31, 1998 (2000 for Greece).
b Old currencies before January 2005 were converted to new currencies using fixed conversion rates.
Fig. 1. Trends of median nominal stock price, median total return stock price, and equally- and value-weighted total return index. Panel A shows the trend
of median nominal stock price, median total return stock price, and the equally- and value-weighted total return index for the 1981e2010 period for 1657 firms
present during the whole sample period. Euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and Turkey
are excluded. All local currencies are “normalized” by converting them to U.S. dollars at the exchange rate on June 30, 2000. The median nominal stock price in
year t is the median of the “normalized” nominal stock prices of the sample firms in year t. The median total return stock price is the median of the adjusted
“normalized” stock prices, where the adjusted stock price reflects the actual total return (growth in the value of a share held over the sample period assuming
dividends are reinvested). We also present trends in the equally- and value-weighted total “normalized” index returns constructed from total returns of the 1657
firms. Both indices are scaled to be one U.S. dollar as of 1981. Panel B shows the trend of median nominal stock price, deflated median total return stock price,
deflated equally- and deflated value-weighted total return index. The last three series are deflated by the Consumer Price Index of the U.S.
The three time series of median total return price, equal-weighted index, and value-weighted index continuously increase
until 2008, suggesting that the actual total returns of the firms are positive during the sample period. However, the median
nominal stock price is flat and stable throughout the sample period. This suggests that although firms generate positive
returns, their nominal share prices are held roughly constant. The 2010 level of nominal stock prices is remarkably similar to
the level of nominal stock prices in 1981. The time series pattern of nominal stock prices is similar to the evidence presented
by Dyl and Eliott (2006) in their analyses of U.S. firms' nominal stock prices. Using 1019 firms with continuous annual price
data available for the period from 1976 through 2001, they show that the average nominal price of these firms changes very
little over the 26-year period when the S&P 500 Composite Index appreciated by 1063% and the NYSE Composite Index
appreciated by 1238%.
In Panel B of Fig. 1, we compare the level of the median nominal share price with the same three time series of total return
indices in Panel A, adjusted for inflation. We use the U.S. Consumer Price Index as the deflator for these three time series. The
figure shows that the three inflation-adjusted time series keep rising and are still above the median nominal stock price time
series even after the inflation adjustment, suggesting that nominal stock prices do not keep pace with inflation. This last
conclusion is the same as Weld et al. (2009).
We next investigate the phenomenon of a stablemedian nominal stock price at the firm level. The underlyingmotivation is
simple. One may observe a stable median nominal price level at a global level even when no anchors exist in individual
nominal prices. This is possible because upward trends of some nominal stock prices may cancel out downward trends in
other nominal stock prices such that one observes no trends in the mean or the median.
2.2. Reversion of stock prices to initial price level: tercile analysis
In this subsection, we examinewhether a firm's stock price tends to revert to its initial stock price level. For each country in
each year, we partition our sample firms into tercile groups based on their nominal stock price levels. We then keep track of a
firm's nominal price movement by noting the tercile groups to which it belongs year by year.
Such an analysis can tell us howmany firms remainwithin their initial tercile group over time. If a large firm-specific shock
hits a firm, whether positive or negative, its nominal stock price will likely deviate from its initial tercile group. If the firm's
manager allows this deviation, the nominal stock pricewill leave its initial tercile group. On the contrary, if the firm's manager
does not allow this deviation but “manages” the nominal share price by corporate actions, such as stock splits, stock or cash
dividends, and reverse stock splits, the nominal stock price will revert to the tercile group to which it initially belonged.
Table 2 presents the results.6 The column labeled “< 50%” refers to the number of firms that stay within their initial tercile
group for less than 50% of their sample years. Similarly, the columns labeled “50%& < 75%” and “ 75%” denote the number
of firms that stay within their initial tercile group, respectively, between 50% and 75%, and more than 75%, of their sample
years.
The last row of the table shows that the nominal stock prices of 7712 sample firms stay in their initial tercile group for
more than 75% of the time. These 7712 firms comprise 39.6% of the total sample of 19,465 firms. If we calculate the percentage
of firms that stay in their initial tercile groupmore than 50% of the time, the percentage rises to 62.9% (¼23.3%þ 39.6%).When
we examine this statistic country by country, we find that themajority of firms stay in their initial tercile groupmore than half
of the time for all countries except Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand.
In sum, Table 2 shows that a majority of our sample firms remain in their initial nominal stock price tercile group most of
the time. This finding is consistent with our conjecture that most firms seem to have anchors. However, as the results are not
that strongdthere is a noticeable movement across tercile groups (see Column< 50%)dwe would classify these results as
suggestive.
2.3. Comparison with Weld et al. (2009)
Weld et al. (2009) assert that nominal price fixation is primarily a U.S. or North American phenomenon. In sharp contrast,
we claim that nominal price fixation is a global phenomenon. To understand why we obtain different results, we examine the
nominal price patterns of the U.K. and Japan for the 1981e2010 period. Weld et al. (2009) examine 16 international stock
exchanges in addition to London and Tokyo. They do not mention the other 14 countries they include in their additional
analysis. They detail the nominal price movement in the U.K. and Japan, which is the reason we choose to focus on the Tokyo
and London stock exchanges. Unlike Weld et al. (2009), who examine average nominal prices, we focus on median nominal
prices. We believe that the pattern of median nominal price changes presents a more reliable trend than that of average
nominal price changes because the nominal stock price data are highly skewed due to some outliers. Even in the U.S., adding
or dropping a firm such as Berkshire Hathaway makes a huge difference in calculating nominal stock price patterns.
6 In Tables 2 and 3, we exclude from our analysis observations after the introduction of the Euro (January 1999) of Euro countries (Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and of Turkey after its currency devaluation (January 2005). This is because old
anchors get disrupted after the regime changes. In later tables, we use these anchor disruptions as a natural experiment. In Table 2, the number of firms
drops to 19,465 from 21,285 in Table 1 as we drop the after-regime-change observations and again require firms to have at least 10 consecutive yearly
observations before the regime change.
The median nominal stock price in the U.K. in our sample is quite stable throughout the sample period and does not show
any trend. It has stayed around the average of £1.2, ranging from a minimum of £0.7 to a maximum of £1.7. In Japan, the
nominal stock price is more volatile and the average of the annual median prices ranges from a minimum of ¥680 to a
maximum of ¥1460. However, when one excludes the 1988e1991 period, the period of the stock market bubble in Japan, the
median nominal share price becomes quite stable. More importantly, themedian nominal stock prices in Japan show no long-
term upward or downward trend whether the bubble period is included or not.
Weld et al. (2009) examine the correlation between average nominal stock prices and the primary stock exchange index
for 16 international stock exchanges, and find that the New York Stock Exchange has the lowest correlation at 0.41, followed
by the Toronto Stock Exchangewith 0.64. They argue that the low correlations in the U.S. and Canada are suggestive of the fact
that nominal price fixation is primarily a North American phenomenon.
Table 2
Percentage of firms whose stock prices in local currency remain in their initial tercile groups per country. This table presents the number and per-
centage of firms whose stock prices remain in their initial tercile groups for a certain percentage of the time for which they are in the sample. The nominal
stock prices for each year are determined at the end of June in each year for the 1981e2010 period. Observations after the introduction of the euro (Jan. 1999)
of euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and after currency devaluation of Turkish lira
(Jan. 2005) are excluded. To be included in the sample, firms are required to have at least 10 consecutive yearly observations. Nominal stock prices for each
country in each year are partitioned by tercile groups and are assigned into a tercile group. The initial tercile group for a firm is the tercile group that it
belongs to when it is initially included in the sample period. The column labeled “< 50%” refers to the number (or the percentage) of firms that stay within
their initial tercile group less than 50% of their sample years. Similarly, the columns labeled “50%& <75%” and “75%” denote the number (or the per-
centage) of firms that stay within their initial tercile group between 50% and 75%, and greater than 75%, respectively, of their sample years.
Country Period Number of firms B/A (%)
All (A) that remain in their initial tercile group
during sample period (B)
<50% 50%&< 75% 75% <50% 50%& <75% 75%
Argentina 94e10 80 33 22 25 41.3 27.5 31.3
Australia 81e10 1154 390 298 466 33.8 25.8 40.4
Austria 86e98 51 17 11 23 33.3 21.6 45.1
Belgium 81e98 110 32 18 60 29.1 16.4 54.5
Brazil 94e10 44 16 15 13 36.4 34.1 29.5
Canada 81e10 1351 440 310 601 32.6 22.9 44.5
Chile 90e10 208 44 28 136 21.2 13.5 65.4
Colombia 95e10 51 11 9 31 21.6 17.6 60.8
Denmark 87e10 224 94 69 61 42.0 30.8 27.2
Egypt 97e10 95 39 21 35 41.1 22.1 36.8
France 81e98 437 148 93 196 33.9 21.3 44.9
Germany 81e98 355 97 86 172 27.3 24.2 48.5
Greece 88e98 71 14 18 39 19.7 25.4 54.9
Hong Kong 81e10 736 341 171 224 46.3 23.2 30.4
India 90e10 1524 602 415 507 39.5 27.2 33.3
Indonesia 91e10 264 138 62 64 52.3 23.5 24.2
Ireland 86e98 53 19 6 28 35.8 11.3 52.8
Israel 86e10 559 202 118 239 36.1 21.1 42.8
Italy 81e98 180 44 34 102 24.4 18.9 56.7
Japan 81e10 2343 818 503 1022 34.9 21.5 43.6
Malaysia 86e10 721 342 171 208 47.4 23.7 28.8
Netherlands 81e98 177 76 37 64 42.9 20.9 36.2
New Zealand 99e10 66 6 15 45 9.1 22.7 68.2
Norway 81e10 180 66 47 67 36.7 26.1 37.2
Pakistan 93e10 301 91 62 148 30.2 20.6 49.2
Peru 92e10 126 31 38 57 24.6 30.2 45.2
Philippines 90e10 209 69 38 102 33.0 18.2 48.8
Portugal 88e98 69 18 19 32 26.1 27.5 46.4
Singapore 83e10 369 142 84 143 38.5 22.8 38.8
South Africa 81e10 463 121 100 242 26.1 21.6 52.3
South Korea 85e10 785 413 190 182 52.6 24.2 23.2
Spain 87e98 94 31 18 45 33.0 19.1 47.9
Sweden 82e10 325 134 78 113 41.2 24.0 34.8
Switzerland 81e10 298 113 83 102 37.9 27.9 34.2
Thailand 89e10 385 200 88 97 51.9 22.9 25.2
Turkey 92e04 168 82 31 55 48.8 18.5 32.7
United Kingdom 81e10 2023 741 432 850 36.6 21.4 42.0
United States 81e10 2816 999 701 1116 35.5 24.9 39.6
Total 81 ~ 10 19,465 7214 4539 7712 37.1 23.3 39.6
We follow their approach and examine the magnitude of correlations for our 38 sample countries. Table 3 shows the
correlations of the median nominal price with median total return stock price, and the equally- and value-weighted total
return index in 1981e2010.
The correlations of the median nominal prices for the U.S. and Canada with their respective value-weighted indices in our
sample of 38 countries are 5th and 16th when ordered from the highest to the lowest correlation. The correlations of the
median nominal prices for the U.S. and Canada with their respective equally-weighted indices in our sample of 38 countries
are 5th and 22nd. The correlations of median nominal prices for these countries with their respective median total return
share price in our sample of 38 countries are 12th and 3rd. It appears that the U.S. and Canadian correlations are not among
the lowest. These countries are not outliers in this sense.
Note that our results are different fromWeld et al.'s (2009) becausewe have a larger data setdmore countries and a longer
time period for non-U.S. countriesdand we focus, because of outliers, on the median rather than the mean nominal price.
3. Nominal stock price after euro introduction
As of January 1,1999, nominal stock prices in nine EUmember counties in our samplewere converted to the euro using the
fixed exchange rate set for each country on December 31, 1998. Table 4 reports the associated conversion rates.
We divide these nine countries into three groups. Each of these groups is given a dummy value. The dummy equals low
(medium) {High} if a firm is from Ireland, Germany, or the Netherlands, whose exchange conversion rates to the euro are low
Table 3
Correlations of median nominal price with median total return stock price, equally- and value-weighted total return index. This table shows the
correlations of median nominal price with median total return stock price, equally- and value-weighted total return index. Observations after the intro-
duction of the Euro (Jan. 1999) of Euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and after
currency devaluation of Turkish lira (Jan. 2005) are excluded. Themedian nominal stock price in year t is themedian of the nominal stock prices of the sample
firms in year t. The median total return stock price is the median of the adjusted stock prices, where the adjusted stock price reflects the actual total return
(growth in the value of a share held over the sample period assuming dividends are reinvested). Equally- and value-weighted total return indices are
constructed for each country using firms' adjusted stock prices where value-weighted is weighted by firms' market capitalizations.
Country No. of firms Correlations of median nominal price with
Median total return price Equaleweighted index Valueeweighted index
Argentina 80 0.82 0.71 0.58
Australia 1154 0.98 0.48 0.48
Austria 51 0.62 0.06 0.18
Belgium 110 0.82 0.86 0.83
Brazil 44 0.18 0.24 0.24
Canada 1351 0.98 0.02 0.07
Chile 208 0.91 0.90 0.89
Colombia 51 0.86 0.85 0.87
Denmark 224 0.15 0.36 0.54
Egypt 95 0.42 0.21 0.09
France 437 0.81 0.26 0.28
Germany 355 0.58 0.16 0.08
Greece 71 0.81 0.25 0.29
Hong Kong 736 0.98 0.35 0.38
India 1524 1.00 0.13 0.08
Indonesia 264 0.84 0.39 0.36
Ireland 53 0.85 0.87 0.85
Israel 559 0.95 0.20 0.21
Italy 180 0.64 0.41 0.10
Japan 2343 0.94 0.51 0.04
Malaysia 721 0.97 0.52 0.40
Netherlands 177 0.29 0.50 0.46
New Zealand 66 0.71 0.58 0.48
Norway 180 0.54 0.49 0.48
Pakistan 301 0.65 0.11 0.08
Peru 126 0.63 0.44 0.42
Philippines 209 0.94 0.09 0.06
Portugal 69 0.86 0.12 0.29
Singapore 369 0.94 0.60 0.64
South Africa 463 0.90 0.05 0.08
South Korea 785 0.32 0.00 0.15
Spain 94 0.63 0.45 0.15
Sweden 325 0.91 0.55 0.54
Switzerland 298 0.26 0.71 0.77
Thailand 385 0.92 0.34 0.39
Turkey 168 0.31 0.18 0.14
United Kingdom 2023 0.81 0.13 0.25
United States 2816 0.91 0.77 0.75
(if a firm is from France, Austria or Belgium, whose exchange conversion rates are medium) {if a firm is from Spain, Portugal,
or Italy, whose exchange conversion rates are high}. These dummy values are also shown in Table 4. Note that, except for
Ireland, whose conversion rate is less than 1 and so nominal prices increased, the conversion rate for the other eight countries
is higher than 1, and so the nominal prices decreased for these countries. This implies that after the euro was introduced,
countries like Italy had larger drops in nominal prices than countries like Germany. This external shock offers us a natural
experiment to investigate what happens during the change. If stock splits (reverse stock splits) are used by firms to decrease
(increase) their nominal prices towards an anchor, Italian firms should split a lot less than German firms (or perhaps even
engage in more reverse-splits) after the euro introduction. We test this prediction.
While the euro came into existence on January 1, 1999, it was only in 2002 that notes and coins began to circulate.
However, the euro started serving as an accounting currency in 1999, and stock prices started being discussed in euros in
1999.7 For this reason, we treat the year 1999 as the year of euro introduction. We partition the sample period into two 2-year
subperiods: 1998 to 1999 before and on the year of euro introduction and 2000 to 2001 after euro introduction. A total of 1850
euro firms are present in our databases during this 4-year period in the nine euro countries.
Table 5 presents the results for stock splits. It shows the proportion of euro firms that conducted stock splits during the
1998e2001 period by country-year. After stock prices are displayed in euros on stock exchanges, we do not see a statistically
significant change in the number of German firms doing stock splits after the introduction of the euro; however, the number
of Italian firms doing stock splits decreases after its introduction. The statistical significance is strong, with a p-value of 5%.
More generally, there are statistically significant drops for two of the three countries (Spain and Italy) with the dummy equal
to high, no statistically significant drops for any country with dummy equal to medium, and a statistically significant drop for
only one country (Netherlands) with the dummy equal to low.
Table 6 presents the results for reverse stock splits. It shows the proportion of euro firms that conducted reverse stock
splits during the 1998e2001 period by country-year. We see that the number of Italian firms doing reverse stock splits
significantly increases after the euro introduction. The change in reverse stock splits for the other countries are insignificant.
In Table 7, we combine the results of Tables 5 and 6. It shows the results of a formal regression analysis at the firm level,
where the dependent variable is the difference in y from the post-euro introduction period (2000e2001) to the pre-euro
Currency name before conversion Units of currency for 1 euro Dummy
Irish Pound 0.78756 Low
German DM 1.95583 Low
Dutch Guilder 2.20371 Low
French Franc 6.55957 Medium
Austrian Schilling 13.7603 Medium
Belgian Franc 40.3399 Medium
Spanish Peseta 166.386 High
Portuguese Escudo 200.482 High
Italian Lira 1936.27 High
Table 5
Proportion of euro firms that had stock splits. This table presents the proportion of Euro firms that conducted stock splits in 1998e2001 by country and
year. A total of 1850 euro firms that have been present during the 4-year period are selected from the nine Euro countries including Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (excluding Greecewhich adopted the Euro in January 2001). The p-values are the result of the test of
mean equality between the subperiods of 1998e1999 and 2000e2001. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Ireland Germany Netherlands France Austria Belgium Spain Portugal Italy
1998 0.114 0.098 0.138 0.050 0.061 0.039 0.273 0.108 0.106
1999 0.068 0.169 0.072 0.045 0.049 0.078 0.306 0.122 0.082
2000 0.068 0.217 0.072 0.090 0.134 0.070 0.215 0.108 0.047
2001 0.068 0.100 0.059 0.073 0.073 0.055 0.091 0.176 0.065
1998e1999 (A) 0.091 0.133 0.105 0.048 0.055 0.059 0.289 0.115 0.094
2000e2001 (B) 0.068 0.158 0.066 0.082 0.104 0.063 0.153 0.142 0.056
(B) e (A) 0.023 0.025 0.039 0.034 0.049 0.004 0.136 0.027 0.038
p-value 0.533 0.104 0.063* 0.000*** 0.058* 0.853 0.000*** 0.453 0.047**
No. of firms 44 480 152 599 82 128 121 74 170
Table 4
Euro conversion rates. The Euro was adopted on January 1, 1999 by 11 member states of the European Union. Greece became the 
12th member state to adopt the Euro on January 1, 2001. This table gives the conversion rate for 9 of these 12 countries. Dum-
my_equals low (medium) {High} if a firm is from Ireland, Germany, or the Netherlands whose exchange conversion rates to euro are 
low (if a firm is from France, Austria or Belgium whose exchange conversion rates are medium) {if a firm is from Spain, Portugal, or 
Italy whose exchange conversion rates are high}.
introduction period (1998e1999). In columns (1) to (3), y is the number of stock splits per firm in each of the two-year sub-
periods divided by 2; in columns (4) to (6), y is the number of stock reverse splits per firm in each of the two¼ year sub-
periods divided by 2. Columns (1) and (4) include all nine euro sample countries; in columns (2) and (5), Ireland, Austria,
and Portugal are excluded where the number of sample firms is less than 100; and columns (3) and (6) include only Germany
and Italy. Independent variables are two dummy variables: dummy_low and dummy_high; dummy_low (dummy_high) takes
the value of 1 if a firm is from Ireland, Germany, or the Netherlands whose exchange conversion rates to the euro are low (if a
firm is from Spain, Portugal, or Italy whose exchange conversion rates are high), and zero otherwise. We also run regressions
without a constant as we have only Germany and Italy in the sample; the results are presented in columns (3) and (4).
The results in column (1) in Table 7 show that, if the conversion rate was x local currency to 1 euro, after the adoption of
the euro, the higher the x, the larger is the drop in stock splits. We find that significant drops in stock splits exist only for
countries whose nominal prices drop a lot (Spain, Portugal, and Italy). The F-test for difference of coefficients between these
two groups of countriesdSpain, Portugal, and Italy where nominal prices drop a lot versus Ireland, Germany, and the
Netherlands where nominal prices dropmuch lowerdis, however, not significant. The F-test results becomes significant if we
drop Ireland, Austria, and Portugal where the number of sample firms is less than 100 (column (2)). The results in column (3)
do not show a statistically significant change in the number of German firms doing stock splits after the introduction of the
euro; however, the number of Italian firms doing stock splits decreases after the introduction. The F-test of equal coefficients
strongly rejects the null hypothesis.
The results for reverse stock splits are shown in columns (4)e(6). The F-test results in column (4) show that Spain,
Portugal, and Italy, where nominal prices drop a lot, have more reverse stock splits than Ireland, Germany, and the
Netherlands, where nominal prices drop much lower. The findings show that reverse stock splits actually decrease for the
latter group of countries. However, the F-test results are insignificant, perhaps because the sample of firms doing reverse
Table 6
Proportion of euro firms that had reverse stock splits. This table presents the proportion of Euro firms that conducted reverse stock splits during
1998e2001 by country and year. A total of 1850 Euro firms that have been present during the 4-year period are selected from the nine Euro countries
including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (excluding Greecewhich adopted the Euro in January 2001). The
pevalues are the result of the test of mean equality between the subperiods of 1998e1999 and 2000e2001. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Ireland Germany Netherlands France Austria Belgium Spain Portugal Italy
1998 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1999 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035
2000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.059
2001 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100
1998e1999 (A) 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018
2000e2001 (B) 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.079
(B) e (A) 0.011 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.062
p-value 0.322 e 0.565 0.158 e e 0.319 e 0.000***
No. of firms 44 480 152 599 82 128 121 74 170
Table 7
Change in stock splits and reverse stock splits at firm level after the introduction of the euro. This table presents the result of a panel regression where
the dependent variable is the difference in y from the post-Euro sub-period (2000e2001) to the pre-Euro sub-period (1998e1999). In columns (1) to (3), y is
the number of stock splits per firm in each of the 2 year sub-periods divided by 2; in columns (4) to (6), y is the number of stock reverse splits per firm in each
of the 2 year sub-periods divided by 2. Columns (1) and (4) use all 9 Euro sample countries; columns (2) and (5) exclude Ireland, Austria, and Portugal where
the number of sample firms is less than 100; and columns (3) and (6) include only Germany and Italy. Independent variables are two dummy variables,
dummy_low and dummy_high. Dummy_low (dummy_high) takes the value of 1 if a firm is from Ireland, Germany, and Netherlands whose exchange
conversion rates to Euro are low (if a firm is from Spain, Portugal, and Italy whose exchange conversion rates are high), and zero otherwise. In columns (3)
and (6), regressions are runwithout constant. t-statistics in parentheses are based clustered standard errors at the country level. Numbers in brackets are p-
values for the test of equal coefficients on dummy_lowand dummy_high. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables Change in stock splits Change in reverse stock splits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dummy_low 0.024 0.019 0.025 0.003* 0.002* e
(e1.28) (e1.00) (1.63) (e1.89) (e2.16) e
dummy_high 0.088** 0.107** 0.038** 0.029 0.036 0.062***
(e2.53) (e2.87) (e2.00) (1.50) (1.68) (4.08)
Constant 0.039*** 0.028*** e 0.001** 0.001** e
(5.55) (4.24) e (2.94) (3.66) e
F-test: dummy_low¼ dummy_high [0.13] [0.08]* [0.01]*** [0.13] [0.14] e
No. of observations 1850 1650 650 1850 1650 650
R2 0.013 0.018 0.008 0.030 0.039 0.089
stock splits is quite small. When we drop Ireland, Austria, and Portugal, where the number of sample firms is less than 100
(column (5)), we obtain similar results. The results in column (6) show a statistically significant increase in the number of
Italian firms doing reverse stock splits after the euro introduction.
In summary, Table 7 provides strong evidence that firms in at least nine non-U.S. countries like to have fixed nominal
anchors, and they use stock splits (reverse stock splits) to decrease (increase) their nominal prices towards an anchor.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we revisitWeld et al.‘s (2009) observation that the average nominal share price of NYSE and AMEX stocks has
been approximately $25 since the Great Depression and this “nominal price fixation is primarily a U.S. or North American
phenomenon.” Using a larger data set of nominal stock prices of individual firms from 38 countries, we find evidence that
supports the existence of an anchor price in most of these countries. The nominal price fixation does not appear to be pri-
marily a U.S. or North American phenomenon, but rather a global phenomenon. In other words, anchors are norms [a point
made in Weld et al. (2009)], and norms exist in many countries.
Do firms use stock splits, which decrease nominal prices, and reverse stock splits, which increase nominal prices, to
maintain nominal anchors? We find evidence for this during the introduction of the euro, where corporate actions in euro-
based firms adjusted to the disappearance of old anchors and the appearance of new anchors. Specifically, firms in countries
like Italy with larger drops in nominal prices after the euro introduction had fewer stock splits after the introduction. The
country with the largest drop in nominal stock prices, Italy, also had higher reverse stock splits after the introduction.
We do not answer why firms anchor. It is a puzzle. We leave it to future research to explore the motivations of firms to
anchor their nominal share prices.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2018.12.006.
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